It seems that the West should think about negotiations.
Putin's regime will fall, but what next? — The Guardian” />
With Putin mired in war in Ukraine and facing unrest at home, it is time for the West to try to negotiate a way out of the precipice. The director of the Eurasia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Public Administration Anatol Lieven ponders the options.
President Putin's announcement of partial mobilization is a sign of the complete failure of Russia's strategy towards Ukraine. Putin's delay in announcing the mobilization is partly because it becomes an implicit admission of that failure and the fact that the “special military operation” is actually a full-scale war that Russia appears to be losing.
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In addition, he rightly feared a negative reaction from the Russian public. His regime is now in grave danger. Another major defeat will most likely destroy him.
What may be far more dangerous than the mobilization itself is the combination of this announcement with the decision to hold referendums in eastern Donbas (recognized by Russia as independent in February) and other territories occupied by Russian troops during the invasion.
The key question is not the results of the “votes” on joining Russia, which are decided in advance, but whether the Russian government and parliament will immediately proceed to annex these territories. If they do, it will be a sign that Moscow has given up all hope of peace and is ready to fight indefinitely; since this annexation will never be accepted by either Ukraine or the West, there is no hope for any diplomatic settlement.
The best that Ukraine can hope for in this case is a series of unstable, intermittent ceasefires by war, as it has been in Kashmir for the past 75 years.
Over the next week, it will become clear whether this is actually Moscow's intention, or whether the referendums are a step to build trump cards in future negotiations. It is worth recalling that the so-called “republics of Donbas” declared independence from Ukraine in 2014, but only eight years later, on the eve of the invasion in February, Moscow officially recognized their independence. All this time, Moscow was negotiating with Ukraine and the West to return these territories to Ukraine with guarantees of full autonomy according to the Minsk agreements of 2015.
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The same thing can happen this time. Some hope that this may be the case was given by Putin's reference in his speech last week to Ukraine's peace proposal in March, which allegedly included a treaty on neutrality and the postponement of territorial disputes for future negotiations. The reasons for the collapse of those peace talks are highly debatable, but in the Russian version of events, the West blocked them, so Ukraine refused.
The reasons why Moscow might want a ceasefire are obvious. Putin's original plan – to seize Kyiv and take control of Ukraine – failed completely. Plan B to seize Russian-speaking territories in the east and south has also stalled, failing to achieve many of its goals, and is now in serious danger of being overturned by Ukrainian counter-offensives.
Read also: Negotiations with the Russian Federation are possible only after the de-occupation of the territories of Ukraine as of December 1, 1991 – Reznikov
With the defeat in the Kharkiv region, Putin's regime was significantly shaken. And if Ukraine expels Russia from Kherson, or from a large part of Donbas, Putin's survival in power will be in question.
If there is no ceasefire or peace talks in the near future, Russia has the means for serious escalation. It can focus on the occupied territories, while at the same time significantly intensifying attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, which have already, after all, begun.
If Russia does annex the occupied territories, it is possible that Putin could threaten nuclear strikes to protect what Moscow would then define as Russian sovereign territory. As the Biden administration increasingly moves away from the “One China” policy, Putin may hope that in return China will significantly increase military and financial aid to his military.
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In the meantime, as we have already observed, unrest in Russian society will inevitably grow. This dissatisfaction is exacerbated by a mixture that is often present in the minds of Russians: disapproval of the war itself and anger at the incompetence of Putin and his entourage in conducting it.
If this continues, a coup d'état against Putin will become a real possibility. It will not necessarily be violent and may go unnoticed in public. Instead, a delegation of politicians will come to Putin and say that in order to preserve the regime itself, he (and several other officials involved in the military failure, such as Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu) must step down in exchange for guarantees of immunity from criminal prosecution and security of property. Something like this happened when Yeltsin handed over power to Putin in 1999.
Members of the Russian establishment who can take such a step are taking a significant risk because this step may turn out to be unsuccessful. In addition to their personal risk, it also threatens Russia itself if the change of leadership leads to a split in the elites, political chaos and a radical weakening of the central government.
Therefore, they will most likely need some guarantees that if Putin is removed, the West will be ready to offer his successor a deal that will allow the new government to claim some development in Russia.
Also read: WSJ: Putin's best option in Ukraine is negotiation
Otherwise, having lost the war and been left with a weakened state and army, the new government could try on the role of a Weimar German democracy after the First world war, remaining forever branded by capitulation and national humiliation.
Aware of this prospect, Putin's successor would most likely blame him personally for the fact that everything went wrong in Ukraine, and in response to increasingly active calls from Russian hardliners, announced full mobilization and significantly intensified the war.
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This could take it beyond the borders of Ukraine. If we are to avoid this prospect, there is still time for the West to accept Putin's implicit offer of talks; but there is not much time.
